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Abstract: Behavioural biometrics are becoming more and more popular. It is hard to find a sensor that is embedded in a
mobile/wearable device, which can’t be exploited to extract behavioural biometric data. In this paper, we investigate data in
behavioural biometrics and how this data is used in experiments, especially examining papers that introduce new datasets. We
will not examine performance accomplished by the algorithms used since a system’s performance is enormously affected by the
data used, its amount and quality. Altogether, 32 papers are examined, assessing how often they are cited, have databases pub-
lished, what modality data are collected, and how the data is used. We offer a roadmap that should be taken into account when
designing behavioural data collection and using collected data. We further look at the General Data Protection Regulation, and its
significance to the scientific research in the field of biometrics. It is possible to conclude that there is a need for publicly available
datasets with comprehensive experimental protocols, similarly established in facial recognition.
1 Introduction
Biometric technology is getting more and more popular and
accepted by society, mainly due to its success in mobile devices
– a wide range of traditional biometric modalities are used in
modern smartphones, including fingerprints, iris and face. This is
unsurprising – the Bank of America “Trends in Consumer Mobil-
ity Report 2016” found that on an average day 39 % of millennials
interact with their smartphone more than anything or anyone else
and feel anxious when they do not have access to their smart-
phone [1]. Even without an alert from the mobile device, we decide
that we “must” check in on social media – and thus our phones –
immediately [2].
Today, the idea of the use of behavioural biometrics does not
seem too unusual. Even South Park – the animated TV series
jokes about this topic. In a 2016 episode of the satire show titled
“Fort Collins”, one of the characters invents “emoji analysis”, which
allows an individual to figure out each student’s and teacher’s
emoji usage and compare it to the person who is trolling the other
characters [3].
There is an intersection between mobile behavioural biomet-
rics and cognitive psychology because many of the features
exploited in behavioural biometrics can be seen as sequences of
motor actions [4]. Thus there should be some lessons learned
from the way humans learn to the possible effect on behavioural
biometrics. In Psychology, it is known as the “power law of prac-
tice” [4], [5], [6]. This law suggests that learning does not occur
at a constant rate – when learning a new task, speed of per-
formance’s improvement declines. This variance of improvement
should also affect the recognition rate if this new “skill” was used
as a behavioural biometric feature [4]. Haasnoot et.al. [4] discuss
the effects of practice and time on the behavioural biometrics
recognition performance, working with a dataset in which sub-
jects performed a 6-element Discrete Sequence Production (DSP)
task [7] with each participant completing 864 trials. They investi-
gate how usage of initial samples (when a subject starts learning to
perform a DSP task) and time between enrol and probe sessions
affects performance. The authors find that early samples nega-
tively affect recognition performance – this reflects the “power law
of practice”. Even after a recognition plateau is reached there is
evidence that behaviour patterns keep changing – this is in line
with the known facts about motor sequence learning – e.g. motor
chunks [8] for DSP task and other tasks connected with motor
memory. Both these findings support the idea that it is crucial
how data is acquired and selected for behavioural experiments.
For example, if behavioural data is acquired with a device that
doesn’t belong to the subject or subject needs to perform a spe-
cific task; there should be allowed enough time for the user to get
accustomed with the device and enough attempts to learn the new
task.
The fact that behavioural biometrics can include the need
for subjects to learn tasks and that humans can change their
behaviour is why this research domain is challenging. However,
a disadvantage of (continuous) behavioural authentication meth-
ods is that it cannot cope with unusual behaviour which can be
caused by alcohol or injuries [9].
Researchers nowadays even offer open-source, extensible
behavioural biometrics framework for Android called Itus [10].
The framework enables real-time classification on resource-
constrained mobile devices for prototyping and deployment of
new behavioural biometric schemes. This framework is widely
used, including [11], [12] [13].
It is hard to find a sensor that is embedded in a mobile/wearable
device which can’t be exploited to extract behavioural biometric
data. Various types of mobile devices are used to capture sensor
data, ranging from wearable sensors to tablet devices. This is why
in this paper we want to investigate data in behavioural biometrics
and how the behavioural data is used. We only examine papers,
that introduce new datasets. If a paper introduces a dataset but
doesn’t perform any experiments or the baseline results (as in
[14]), we look into the same author successive work that presents
such results. Especially, we focus on papers that:
•promote reproducible research by offering public datasets or
using publicly available data;
•test generalisation properties of developed algorithms by using
different subject data for training and testing or by using multi-
ple datasets.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2
presents related works – different surveys of papers published in
the field of behavioural biometrics; in Section 3 we present the
motivation for this work and specifics about biometric data col-
lection. Section 4 presents what we are examining when looking at
the papers that are introducing new datasets; Section 5 – what the
sensors currently used in behavioural biometrics are. The main
contribution is in Section 6 presenting the summary of 32 articles.
In Section 7 selected papers are analysed in detail. We discuss the
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General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and its importance
to research in biometrics in Section 8. Conclusions are given in
Section 9.
2 Related work
Multiple review papers summarise and categorise existing work in
mobile behavioural biometrics.
Alzubaidi et.al. [15] presents an extensive study of current
(paper was published in the year 2016) research about behavioural
biometrics. They analyse more than 70 studies and use seven
behavioural biometric feature categories: hand waving (2 studies);
keystroke (9 studies); touch screen (22 studies); gait (13 stud-
ies); signature (11 studies); voice (5 studies); behaviour profiling
(9 studies). The paper also presents lessons learned, open prob-
lems and future trends including the opinion that behavioural
biometrics are considered promising for providing continuous
authentication for consumers; machine learning algorithms are
well-suited to generalise from past user behaviours to “predict the
future”; most current studies gather and record data under lab-
oratory conditions; and that most published methods have been
tested on the Android platform and ignored other platforms, e.g.
iOS and Windows Mobile.
Rybnicek et.al. [16] presents an overview of biometric traits that
can be used to secure mobile devices. The authors describe in
detail keyboard-based, touchscreen-based, accelerometer-based,
gyroscope-based as well as hybrid authentication methods. More-
over, the authors discuss multiple aspects of behavioural biomet-
rics for mobile devices and offer a roadmap. These aspects are cri-
teria for using biometric data; data collection; system architectural
structure; and biometric features and classification.
In [17] behavioural biometric systems are referred to as Trans-
parent Authentication Systems (TAS). The paper presents a review
of these systems for mobile device security. The authors classify
behavioural biometric systems into six categories: keystroke based
authentication; gait based authentication; touch-based authenti-
cation; device sensor based authentication; behavioural profiling
based authentication; and multi-modal transparent authentifica-
tion and analyse 33 papers published between the year 2007 and
2015.
Alotaibi et.al. [18] summarises biometric authentication meth-
ods on mobile phones. In their study the authors classify bio-
metrics used in 11 groups. Five physiological: fingerprint, face,
iris, retina, and hand/palm recognition and six behavioural: voice,
signature, gait, behaviour profiling (defined by authors as “tech-
niques that aim to identify people based upon the way in which
they interact with the services of their mobile devices”), keystroke
dynamics, and touch dynamics. The authors also propose a
framework for establishing a reliable authentication mechanism
through implementing a multimodal biometric user authentica-
tion. Only there seem to be some inaccuracies in the mathematics
used when expected average FRR (False Recognition Rate) and
FAR (False Acceptance Rate) is calculated. The authors claim that
both FRR and FAR can be improved by five orders of magni-
tude when the user has given three authentification tries and an
option to enter a PIN if the person has not been recognised during
the biometric authentication stage (similarly as the authentica-
tion mechanism in iPhones with Touch ID). Although, this would
improve the FRR (since the genuine user has more attempts to
get accepted), but this is not true for the FAR, since more tries
would suggest that there is a more significant probability of getting
accepted incorrectly/guessing the PIN.
We did not find existing reviews that specifically discuss
behavioural data and the protocols used.
3 Data collection and use
Stan et.al. [19] states that “the heart of designing and conduct-
ing evaluations is the experimental protocol. The protocol states
how an evaluation is to be conducted and how the results are
to be computed”. Our investigation suggests, researchers do not
disclose much about data collection or how the collected data
are used – what are the protocols and percentages of data used
for training and testing. Often the reader can conclude, that col-
lected data is used in an All VS All scenario. Generally speaking,
this means that all data was available to the researcher during the
development of the recognition algorithms. One or some samples
of each subject’s data are used as templates and the rest of the
samples as probes (see definition in Table 3). All VS All means that
all each subject’s probes were scored against every subject’s tem-
plate e.g., if there are N subjects, each with k samples and for each
subject there is 1 sample used as a template, then all remaining
subject’s samples (k − 1) are scored against all subject templates
(N templates), generating N 2 · (k − 1) scores, N · (k − 1) genuine
and N · (N −1) · (k−1) zero effort impostor scores.
Often no generalisation (algorithm testing on multiple databases/
data subsets with non-overlapping subject data) of developed
algorithms is researched – it is not clear to the reader how the
developed system will perform with unseen subject data or if the
system was overfitted. Thus, it becomes hard to evaluate both –
the modalities used and the developed algorithms.
The authors of this paper think that data collection, prepara-
tion (design of data protocols, the division of data into different
datasets), as well as testing how the developed algorithms would
generalise across unseen subjects are some of the most critical
stages in the whole process of biometric research. Unfortunately,
often in the literature, there is a limited information on how this
process should be done. In books about biometrics, there can
be no information – e.g. [20] or description of basic – All VS All
protocol – e.g. in [21].
In literature about machine learning, especially Deep Learn-
ing, the importance of data and how data should be treated, as
well as testing of algorithm generalisation is much more widely
discussed. It is well known in the machine learning community
that it is vital to have separate training, test, and validation sets
[22] [23]. “The training set is used to fit the models; the valida-
tion set is used to estimate prediction error for model selection
and the test set is used for assessment of the generalisation error
of the final chosen model. The test set should be kept in a vault,
and be brought out only at the end of the data analysis” – [23].
A typical split might be 50 % for training dataset, and 25 % each
for validation and testing datasets. The validation set (but not the
test set) can also be approximated by data re-use, by using cross-
validation and bootstrap methods [23]. Luckily, some papers do
discuss data importance for biometric experiments. [29] claims
that to carry realistic (and unbiased) experiments, it is necessary
to use different populations and data sets for development and
evaluation. [31] investigate the effect on the performance of vio-
lating the rules for creating training sets of “the Good, the Bad, and
the Ugly” (GBU) biometric recognition challenge problem. The
authors show that disregarding the GBU protocol can substantially
overestimate performance on the specific face recognition task.
Verification performance on the most challenging dataset – ugly
increases from 11.4 % (no subject overlap) to 15 % when 91 sub-
jects (out of 222 subjects) overlap in training and testing data sets
(same subject different images). If images are drawn directly from
the test set, verification performance increases hugely to 61.2 %.
The authors conclude that “there are applications of face recog-
nition where training and testing on the same people may be a
reasonable thing to do, such as with family photo libraries”. They
also recommend that researchers publicly post their training sets.
This should provide confidence in the veracity of the reported
results.
Other researchers, as suggested similarly in the machine learn-
ing literature, introduce three subsets – training, development (in
other literature and this paper development data set is called veri-
fication) and testing. There are no overlapping subjects between
these subsets [32]. The authors claim that “such choice guar-
antees that specific behaviour (such as eye-blinking patterns or
head-poses) are not picked up by detectors and final systems
generalise well”. The authors recommend that training and devel-
opment samples be used to teach classifiers how to discriminate.
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The training dataset can be used for training the classifier and
the development data to estimate when the training should be
stopped. Another way, which may generalise less well, is to merge
both training and development datasets; use the merged set as
training data and to formulate stop criteria. Finally, the test set
should be solely used to report error rates and performance char-
acteristics. Such, database division into three subsets and purpose
are summarised in Table 2. If a single number is desired, a thresh-
old τ should be chosen at the development (verification) set, and
the Half-Total Error Rate (HTER) reported using the test set data
[32] [33].
The factors that we find essential when collecting and manag-
ing data – a roadmap to data use – are summarised in Table 1.
4 Assessment
We summarise and discuss data used in the research of mobile
behavioural biometrics, focusing on papers that present new
datasets. In this section, we explain to the reader how we are
assessing the 32 papers that are viewed in this survey.
In most of the papers surveyed in Table 5 data are collected
to perform biometric experiments to assess the performance of
developed recognition algorithms. The exception is the “MIT Real-
ity Mining Dataset” [34]. This study explores the capabilities of the
smartphones and enables social scientists to investigate human
interactions beyond the traditional survey-based methodology,
rather than as a specific study about behavioural biometrics.
4.1 Data used
In the papers presenting new datasets, we examine what sensor
data is collected. Due to space constraints, we describe only the
type of sensors used, not specific usage details (e.g. the particu-
lar touch events are examined). The main data categories used
are summarised in Section 5. We have summarised the subject
count, whether subjects needed to perform a specific task (every-
thing from walking [35] to navigating maps [14]). Because it takes
time to learn a task and that subject’s behavioural patterns can
change over time, we examine whether researchers collect multi-
ple session data, and if so, the time gap between sessions. It is also
possible to have an “unconstrained” data collection, when data
are captured over multiple days and doesn’t require the subject
to interact with the system in any particular way, nor perform any
task. We are interested in the overall duration of the data collection
(sum of all data collection session duration).
In some studies, it is argued that subjects should not know the
real data capture reason in order not to affect the way how sub-
jects interact with the mobile devices during data collection (e.g.
[13]). Of course, it may be perceived to be unethical, if an “uncon-
strained” data collection’s subjects would not know the collection
reason and the type of data that is collected.
Most of all we think that it is essential if authors publish data
used in experiments and provide others with the data protocols
so that others can reproduce their experiments identically. We try
to see if there is a correlation between the fact that data is pub-
lished and the citation count. It would seem logical, that papers
that introduce public datasets would be cited more.
4.2 Experiments performed
We are not examining performance accomplished by the algo-
rithms used, since a system’s performance is enormously affected
by the data used. For example, the number of subjects in the
database, the data usage protocols (the instructions of which
probes should be scored with which templates), feature/score
fusion used, quality of the data (e.g. is the data collection unbi-
ased, were all participant data collected in the same way). Some
datasets are more challenging, allowing subjects to use the mobile
device more freely and comprising of more subjects. It would
not mean that algorithms developed using this dataset are worse,
though the performance on this challenging dataset is lower. This
is why we are investigating only general facts that would give an
insight of how data was treated while performing experiments. We
will ask whether authors explore generalisation, open-set identi-
fication, and whether new subjects can easily be enroled into the
database, and what kind of data was used as imposters.
Table 1 A Roadmap – set of actions when collecting and using data
Action Reason
Acquire explicit consent from subjects; implement necessary
technical and organisational measures for data collection,
storage and usage.
General Data Protection Regulation [24].
Seamless data collection using subject’s device OR (allowing
subject to practice/learn task AND allowing subject to get
used to the device).
“Power law of practice” [4], [5], [6].
Allow time between template and probe dataset collection. To explore behaviour pattern changing, e.g. due to - motor
sequence learning e.g. because of motor chunks [8]; [25] dis-
cusses necessity to acquire data over multiple days in at least
three sessions; ISO/IEC 19795-1 [26] states that enrolment
and testing is normally carried out in different sessions, sep-
arated by days, weeks, months or years, depending on the
target application.
For verification experiments – (false accept rate (FAR) AND
false reject rate (FRR)) OR ROC OR DET curves should be
reported.
ISO standard [27]; the best way to present or compare biomet-
ric verification performance is the ROC curve [28].
For open-set identification experiments – (False match rate
AND false non-match rate) OR (False positive identification
rates AND corresponding false negative identification rates).
ISO standard [27]; [19].
Using training, testing and validation data sets. Feature space and the verification system parameters must be
trained using completely independent data from that used for
specifying client models [29].
Assessment of generalisation by testing algorithms using
multiple, publicly available databases.
To see how good algorithms generalise on different datasets,
and compare results with other researchers.
Results should be reproducible/reproducible research
approach should be used.
To show evidence of the correctness of one’s results and to
aspire to reproducibility is to enable others to explore meth-
ods used and results acquired [30].
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Table 2 Division of a database’s data into subsets (as used in [32], [33])
Subset Subcategories Purpose










The classifier is designed to correctly classify unseen objects
which are not used during the training process. Generalisa-
tion represents the capacity of the classifier to respond to this
task. When a classifier has a good generalisation capacity it can
correctly classify unseen examples [36]. To investigate, whether
generalisation is performed, we are going to separately evaluate
whether authors train system parameters and feature space on
independent data or use multiple datasets.
•Open-Set Identification
It is unknown whether the subject presented to the biomet-
ric system for recognition has enrolled in the system or not.
Therefore, the system needs to decide whether to reject or recog-
nise person as one of the enrolled subjects. It is the opposite of
“Closed-Set Identification” [37]. We will use this definition, sim-
ilarly used in [38], [39], [40] and [41]. [19] define two metrics for
open-set identification: False Alarm Rate and Detection Identi-
fication Rate. The Detection Identification Rate is the fraction of
the genuine probes (that belongs to an enrolled subject) that are
correctly detected and identified. The Detection Identification
Rate is a function of the operational threshold. The Detection
Identification Rate can be determined at a specific rank n this
requires that after matching, all similarity scores between gen-
uine probes and the enroled client templates are examined and
sorted. A probe has rank n if the similarity score between it and
its true template in the gallery is the nth largest similarity score.
False Alarm Rate provides performance when a probe does not
belong to any subject enroled in the database [19]. In this arti-
cle, we will not be so formal; only assessing what the probes are
(e.g., are present probes of subjects, that are not enrolled in the
template subset, so-called unknown-unknowns [39]), not what
are the metrics used.
•Can new subjects be easily enroled
Although this is a quantitative measure, we still believe that it is
vital to assess, whether the recognition algorithm used, allows
easy enrollment of new subjects. [31] states that “there are appli-
cations of face recognition where training and testing on the
same people may be a reasonable thing to do, such as fam-
ily photo libraries. However, it is entirely unacceptable for large
scale deployed systems that must manage many enrolled people.
For example, retraining a deployed system each time that a new
person is enrolled is a logistical nightmare.” The methodology of
the ease of new subject enrolment is described in Table 4.
An extended summary of parameters evaluated can be seen in
Table 4.
4.3 Vocabulary used
There is a frequent confusion with terms used in behavioural
biometrics studies even to the point of consistency of the nomen-
clature of behavioural biometrics. The names used in different
studies:
•continuous authentication – [13], [42], [43], [14], [44], [45];
•continuous and passive authentication – [46];
•active authentication – [45];
•non-intrusive authentication – [47];
•non-intrusive user verification – [48];
•transparent authentication systems – [35];









[51] incoming biometric sample that is
compared to the stored template.
enrol dataset Collection of biometric templates, e.g.
in training dataset.
probe dataset Collection of biometric probes, e.g. in
training dataset.
attempt Submission of one (or a sequence of)
biometric samples to the system [26].
session Data collection process separated by
at least one day.
training
dataset
Dataset that is used to fit the models
[23] and train the classifier.
validation
dataset
Dataset that is used to estimate pre-
diction error for model selection [23],
and to estimate system’s thresholds.
Validation set consists of enrol tem-
plates and probes.
test dataset The dataset that is used for assess-
ment of the generalisation error of the
final chosen model. Ideally, the test
set should be kept in a “vault”, and
be brought out only at the end of the
data analysis. [23]. The test set con-
sists of enrol templates and probes.
Test set should be solely used to report
error rates and performance curves
[32], [33].
verification The process of confirming a biometric
claim through biometric comparison
[51]. Also referred to as 1 : 1 matching
[19].
identification The process of searching against a bio-
metric enrolment database to find and
return the biometric reference iden-
tifier(s) attributable to a single indi-




It is unknown whether the subject pre-
sented to the biometric system for
recognition has been enrolled in the
system or not. Therefore, the system
needs to decide whether to reject or




Opposite of “Open-Set Identification”
[37].
•unobtrusive authentication – [35];
•implicit user identity recognition – [49];
•implicit authentication – [50], [10].
Because of this, we summarise vocabulary used in this paper
in Table 3 based on the ISO/IEC 2382-37:2017 standard [51]. For
example, some papers (e.g. [52]) use terms “training” as building
an enrol model and “verification” as probing templates against
probes, e.g. [44]) “training” means enrol templates and “testing”
– to score them against probes. We will use terms as defined in
machine learning community, as identified in, for example, [32],
[33].
5 Sensors used in behavioural biometrics
In mobile behavioural biometric studies, data are collected using
mobile devices – phones, tablets and wearable devices. In this
paper, we will not be looking at traditional biometric modalities
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used in experiments, as undertaken in some papers. For example,
[53] uses face images as the only behavioural modality, but paper
[54] uses voice as one of the modalities.
Almost all data are in the form of time sequences (e.g.
accelerometer data are acquired over time with a specific sample-
rate). The time dimension will not be separately discussed. Each
sensor data is described in detail, giving examples if possible.
•accelerometer (used in [43], [14], [45], [35]) one of two sensors
that are provided by Android platform to determine the position
of a device [55]. Gravity data can be calculated using accelerom-
eter data together with magnetometer and the gyroscope [56].
A device’s orientation (as used in [45], [47]) can be computed
using accelerometer and magnetometer [57]. This is why from
now on the use of orientation sensor data will be denoted as the
use of accelerometer and magnetometer. The accelerometer can
be used to extract information about a person’s gait.
[45] focuses on motion sensor output while subjects are per-
forming touch-tapping and single-touch-sliding actions. When
users touch a smartphone, the accelerometer measures acceler-
ation force applied to it; the gyroscope measures the rate of rota-
tion, magnetometer measures the ambient geomagnetic field for
three axes. It is possible to also determine degrees of phone’s
rotation around three physical axes. Users may develop per-
sonal operational habits, which are based on different rhythm,
strength, and angle preferences of finger movements.
•geomagnetic field sensor monitors changes in the earth’s mag-
netic field [58].
•magnetometer is similar to the geomagnetic field sensor, except
that no hard iron calibration is applied to the magnetic field [55].
•gyroscope measures the rotation around a device’s axis [59].
Accelerometer and gyroscope sensors are always hardware-
based, and variety of software-based sensors can use their data
[60].
•location in this paper denotes location through WiFi informa-
tion, cell tower information, GPS and Bluetooth information.
One of the key ideas in [34] is to exploit the fact that modern
phones use multiple networks (e.g. Bluetooth and GSM) data
about multiple networks can complement each other to deter-
mine subjects’ location and actions. Both radio tower IDs and
nearby Bluetooth devices can be logged to obtain different types
of information. Every Bluetooth device is capable of “device-
discovery,” which allows them to collect information on other
Bluetooth devices within 5-10 m. This information includes the
Bluetooth MAC address (BTID), device name, and device type.
The BTID is a 12-digit hex number unique to the particular
device.
The authors of [61] recorded the GPS coordinates if users
enabled it. They also collected location calculated and provided
by the Android OS, obfuscated SSID if a user is connected to a
WiFi network and IDs of cellular base stations.
In [62] location was determined using GPS data when outdoors
and WiFi when indoors.
•call data. As call data we denote SMS meta-data, call meta-data
and call logs.
[34] logged calls and SMS, call duration, unique callee identifier
(natural number).
In [61] the authors record the time and direction (incoming or
outgoing) for SMS messages and calls. Data about call duration
are collected. The authors did not collect subjects phone contact
list and used obfuscate phone numbers.
•app usage – monitoring of applications being used.
The authors of [63] and [52] collect data from five popular social
network services – Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Skype and What-
sApp. Collected data includes a session ID, application name, the
duration of that session, the amount of data used in the session
and the initial location where the session started.
In [62] the application’s name is used as the unique identi-
fier, and the number of times a user uses each application is
counted. This means that application usage is not constrained to
a number of applications. For each user, a classification model is
constructed by determining the top 20 entities used by that user
in the training set. Entities that do not appear in the top 20 are
considered outliers and ignored.
•browser history – monitoring of websites being visited.
Browser history and obfuscated domain name of each URL vis-
ited was recorded by [61].
[62] used the domain of the URL as the unique identifier and
counted the number of times a user visits each domain in the
training set. For example, “m.facebook.com” is a considered a
different domain than “www.facebook.com” because the sub-
domain is different. Similarly to application usage, a user’s web
history model was determined by the top 20 entities visited. Enti-
ties that do not appear in the top 20 are considered outliers and
are ignored in this classifier.
•data usage – monitoring of data being uploaded or downloaded.
•phone status – meta-data about the phone.
In [34] authors collect information about phone status such as
charging and idle. In [64] information about battery level was
recorded and analysed.
•stylometry is the study of linguistic style. It has been extensively
applied to the problems of authorship attribution, identification,
and verification [62].
The authors in [62] collected text entered by subjects via a soft
keyboard. The activity in the majority of cases was communi-
cation via SMS, MMS, WhatsApp, Facebook, Google Hangouts,
and other chat applications. Text input was mostly completed
in short bursts. A tracking application captured the keys that
were pressed on the keyboard and not the auto-corrected result.
The majority of the typed messages, therefore, had a consider-
able amount of misspellings and words that were erased in the
final submitted message. In such way, it was possible to acquire
unique typing idiosyncrasies that auto-correct can conceal.
•touch – denotes usage of the touchscreen.
In [14] touch describes: raw touch events: a timestamp, finger
count, finger ID, raw touch type, X/Y coordinates, contact size,
screen orientation data, tap gesture data, scale gesture data,
scroll gesture data, fling gesture data, key press on virtual key-
board data including press type, and key ID.
The authors of [13] define two user touch actions that are fre-
quent and primitive and call them “trigger-actions”. Whenever
the user performs such action, the system records touch data.
These actions are: sliding horizontally over the screen (e.g. when
browsing through images or navigating to the next page of icons
in the main screen) and sliding vertically over the screen (e.g. to
move screen content up or down, this is typically done for read-
ing e-mail, documents or web-pages).
In [45] it was found that more than 98 % of touch-interaction
behaviour comprises touch-tapping and single-touch-sliding
actions.
•proximity sensor – determine how close the face of a device is to
an object [55].
•contextual data – the study presented in [61] uses contextual
information, such as the content of user’s calendar entries.
•secondary camera – phone’s front-facing camera.
The authors of [65] uses the secondary camera to capture subject
ear images, when they are answering a call.
6 Discussion
In this section where we summarise existing published work and
investigate what are the trends, regarding data collection and
its use in behavioural biometrics. Table 4 summarises the crite-
ria used to evaluate papers, whilst Table 5 presents the detailed
information about 32 papers.
6.1 Effect of data publishing on citation count
In Table 6 the number of citations per year for papers presenting
published and unpublished data is shown. The plot was made by
using data summarised in Table 5. If multiple papers were used
to present one data set, they both were separately included in the
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Table 4 Explanations to the parameters used in Table 5
term explanation
Author The first author of the paper. More than one paper can be mentioned, e.g. if
dataset and the baseline experiments are presented in different papers.
Cit. per year. Paper’s citations per year. To calculate this parameter Google Scholar
(https://scholar.google.com/) data was used. Data were acquired
on 15.12.2017. Citations per year Cpy is calculated as follows:
Cpy = C
2018− y ,
where C – all paper’s citations, y – the year in which paper was published.
Because this survey does not include papers published after the year 2017,
there can’t be the division by zero.
Year Year in which paper (papers) were published.
OS OS used on the mobile device for data collection.
Data published Is data publicly available? (yes/no)
Software published Is software used to perform experiments and produce results published?
(yes/no)
Sensors used Sensor data collected. For the explanation of different sensors see Section 5.
No. of subjects The number of subjects. This can be given as N (K ), where N >K . In this case,
N is a number of subjects in the used dataset, but K – the number of subjects
used in experiments. This would mean that part of subjects were excluded
from experiments.
In some open-set identification papers K is the number of enrol templates,
and N subject data are used as imposters.
Purpose known Do the subjects know the purpose of the data collection at the time when
data collection takes place? (yes/no)
Unsupervised If data collection were unsupervised? (yes/no) Supervised data collection
would mean that at all times there was a person who interacts with the
subjects (biometric attendant [51]).
Specific task Did users perform a specific task? (yes/no)
The opposite would be, that users were asked to use their mobile devices as
usual, and data were collected in the background. The specific task cannot
be related to the actual mobile device’s use (e.g., in [35] the task is to walk).
No. of sessions The number of data collection sessions. Although in some papers different
definitions are used, we define a session as data collection process separated
by at least one day. This means that 2 data collection attempts in a single
day are counted as single data collection session. Continuous data collection,
which spans over multiple days we define as a single session.
Days between sessions Days between sessions. If there are multiple sessions with irregular time gaps
between them, an average amount is given. If data collection was performed
on consecutive days, “days between sessions” = 0.
Duration, approx Duration of the entire data collection (e.g. the sum of individual attempt
duration).
Multiple datasets used Were multiple datasets used (e.g. one for training feature space and fix-
ing thresholds, other to obtain recognition results) with non-overlapping
subjects? (yes/no)
Multiple databases used Were multiple databases used to research generalisation? (yes/no)
Open-set identification Was the developed recognition algorithms tested on open-set probe set?
(yes/no)
New subjects easily enrolled Can new subjects be easy enrolled? (yes/no) Whether it is easy to enrol new
subject is a qualitative measure, but the authors of this paper think that it
is vital to be assessed. The new subject enrollment process is straightfor-
ward with most hand-crafted algorithms, HMMs, and if machine learning is
used and the problem is approached as a one class problem (the one class
is composed of the genuine templates. New subject enrollment is difficult
if a classifier with k output classes, where k = count of enrolled subjects, is
used. As well as, if recognition is approached as a two-class problem, where
one class represents the genuine templates, and the other class – imposters.
This is opposed to a one-class problem, where the classifier is unaware of
the imposter data. We still find that if the recognition is addressed as a two-
class problem, it is difficult to enrol new subjects, since data to build both
class models are available before a subject is enrolled. We believe that a more
convincing method should be used.
Authors of [48] go further and say that “two-class classifier requires input data
from impostors or non-target users at the training phase, which is unrealistic
and raises privacy concerns”.
Imposters What are the imposter probe samples, when a system is evaluated. For
example other subject data, synthetic data.
Comments Comments about the paper.
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M. Frank et.al. [13] 57.00 2012 Android  G# touch 41 # # lab  2 7 60 min # # # # others Discussed in detail
J. S. Wu et.al. [46] 1.33 2015 Android # # touch 10 ∅ ∅ lab ∅ 1 - 60 min # # # # others
K. Khare et.al. [42] 0.00 2015 iOS # # touch 20 # # ∅  1 - 60 min # # 2 # others
A. Roy et.al. [43] 1.67 2015 Android # # touch, accelerometer,
gyroscope
42 # # lab  1 - 30 min # # #  others






Android  # accelerometer, gyro-
scope, magnetometer,
touch
100 (90) ∅ # lab  1 - 4 hours # # #  others Discussed in detail
C. Shen et.al. [45] 0.00 2017 Android # # touch, accelerom-
eter, gyroscope
magnetometer




C. C. Lin et.al. [47] 0.00 2015 Android # # touch, accelerometer,
magnetometer














2017 Android G# # app usage, location,
data usage
6 ∅  various # 1 - 76 days # # # # others
N. Eagle et.al. [34] 213.67 2006 Symbian  # call logs, location, app
usage, phone status
100 ∅  various # 1 - 9 months - - - - MIT Reality Min-
ing Dataset,
discussed in detail
X. Zhao et.al. [66] 1.00 2013 Android # # touch 30  # lab  6 3 1 hour # # #  others




276(50)   various # 1 - 12 days # #  # others and
synthetic
data
T. Feng et.al. [49] 16.50 2014 Android # # touch, app usage 123(23)   various # 1 - 21 days # #   others
L. Fridman et.al. [62] 24.00 2017 Android # # stylometry, app usage,
browser history, loca-
tion
200   various # 1 - 30 days # # # # others
M. E. Phillips et.al [64] 0.50 2016 iOS # # location, accelerome-
ter, gyroscope, magne-
tometer, phone status






# # textile pressure
sensors, accelerometer
8  # #  1 - 5 min # # # # others
M. Smith-Creasey
et.al. [68]






6 ∅  various # 1 - 14 days # #∗ # # others ∗ 2 datasets
merged into one
R. Kumar et.al. [69] 2.5 2016 Android # # touch, accelerometer 28  # lab  7 0 2.5 hours # # # # others
M. Temper et.al. [9] 0 2016 Android # # touch 25  various  1 - 2 weeks # # # # others
Antal et.al. [70], [71] 1.25,
3.00







Damopoulos et.al. [72] 8.4 2013 iOS # # touch 18   various # 1 - 24 hours # # # # others
Kolly et.al. [73] 6.17 2012 Android # # touch 14890 ∅  various  - - ∅ ∅ # # # others Recognition per-
formed on small
subject groups - 2
to 15 people




Feng et.al. [75] 0 2017 Android # # call data, app usage,
browser history, phone
status, location
5 ∅  various # 1 - 50 days # # # # others




Android  # secondary cam-
era, accelerometer,
gyroscope
100  # lab  3 4 30 min # # #  others Discussed in detail
Zheng et.al. [48] 21 2012 Android # # touch, accelerometer 80  # lab  1 - 5 min # # #  others
De Luca et.al. [50] 55.7 2012 Android  # touch 34 #  various  21 0 1.5 hours # # #  others Discussed in detail
Sae-Bae et.al. [77] 37.7 2012 iOS # # touch 34  # lab  1 - 30 min # # #  others





# # touch, accelerometer,
gyroscope
40  # lab  1 - 30 min # # # # others
Li et.al. [79] 26.2 2013 Android # # touch 75 ∅  lab # 1 - 20 min # #  # others






30 ∅ # lab  3 5 1 hour # # #  others
Neal et.al. [81] 1.7 2015 ∅ # # app usage, location 200 ∅ # various # 1 - 19 months # # # # others
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N. Eagle et.al. [34] 213.7
M. Frank et.al. [13] 57.0
De Luca et.al. [50] 55.7
Yang et.al. [14], Sitová
et.al. [44]
16.5
Antal et.al. [70], [71] 3.0
Yang et.al. [14], Sitová
et.al. [44]
1.2
Antal et.al. [70], [71] 1.2
Abate et.al. [65], [76] 1.0





Feng et.al. [78] 29.7
E. Shi et.al. [61] 26.4
Li et.al. [79] 26.2
L. Fridman et.al. [62] 24.0
Zheng et.al. [48] 21.0
T. Feng et.al. [49] 16.5
Damopoulos et.al. [72] 8.4
Kolly et.al. [73] 6.2
Yang et.al. [80] 6.0
R. Kumar et.al. [69] 2.5
Neal et.al. [81] 1.7
A. Roy et.al. [43] 1.7
N. Al-Naffakh et.al. [35] 1.5
J. S. Wu et.al. [46] 1.3
X. Zhao et.al. [66] 1.0
M. E. Phillips et.al. [64] 0.5




K. Khare et.al.[42] 0.0




Feng et.al. [75] 0.0
C. Shen et.al. [45] 0.0
C. C. Lin et.al. [47] 0.0
mean 8.5
making of this table. Papers in which data were partially published
(marked withG# in Table 5) were not included in the plot.
Sadly, there are too few studies that publish data (six studies,
nine papers involved). Moreover, because of that, it is difficult to
make any conclusions. After observing Table 6, it can be noticed
that if data is published, it is possible for the paper to become
more popular. As it can be seen with Eagle et.al. [34] (MIT Reality
Mining Dataset) with 213.67 citations on average per year, Frank
et.al. [13] with 57 citations per year, and De Luca et.al. [50] with
55.7 citations per year.
However, there are widely cited studies, that do not publish data
(Sae-Bae et.al. [77] with 37.7 citations per year; Feng et.al. [78] –
29.7 citations per year; Shi et.al. [61] – 26.43 citations per year; Li
et.al. [79] – 26.2 citations per year; Fridman et.al. [62] – 24 citations
per year). These studies appear as outliners between papers that
aren’t publishing collected behavioural data.
Interestingly, 6 out of 10 most cited studies involves unsuper-
vised data collection. It would suggest that unsupervised data
capture when a mobile device is given to the subjects or an app
is installed to a subject’s phone, and it is asked to use it, without
someone monitoring the way data is being captured, are gaining
attention and popularity. Amongst ten most cited studies, in half
of them, subjects had to perform a specific task.
6.2 Trends in use of mobile operating systems
In most of the 32 reviewed papers devices running the Android
operating system are used. These mobile devices include wear-
able devices – [35] use Microsoft Band 2, and [80] uses Samsung
Galaxy Gear smartwatch. Use of the Android operating system is
understandable since it gives higher freedom for the app devel-
opers than iOS where some concepts are difficult to be accom-
plished [42]. The “MIT Reality Mining Dataset” [34] uses Nokia
6600 phones using Symbian Series 60 operating system (data were
collected in the year 2004); [64] and [42] uses iOS devices (iPhone
5S and iPhone 6 accordingly). In [72] authors recruited 18 subjects
to collect data using their iPhones.
Two studies used a different kind of wearable devices: the
authors in [67] used Sensoria smart socks that are embedded with
three proprietary textile pressure sensors and a 3-axis accelerom-
eter. The authors of [78] in addition to an Android device also uses
a digital sensor glove equipped with accelerometer and gyroscope
sensor boards based on the Arduino platform. It provides the fin-
ger movement information. The authors collected two datasets –
only touch data from the mobile device and touch data together
with the finger movement data. The proved that the additional
finger movement information improves the recognition rate.
6.3 Modalities used and subject count in presented
databases
It can be summarised that different researchers’ approaches to
data collection are diverse: the duration of the data collection can
span from approximately 2.5 minutes (as in [64]) to 19 months
(in “Mobile Device Application, Bluetooth, and Wi-Fi Usage Data
as Behavioral Biometric Traits” – [81]). The same applies to the
number of subjects, ranging from 4 participants in [64] to 14,890
subjects in [73]. There are multiple examples, with the subject
count over 100. For example, [62] and [81] with 200 subjects,
and the three publicly available datasets – “MIT Reality Mining
Dataset” [34], [14], and [76], each with 100 subject’s data.
How data are collected also differs considerably. Two extremes
are entirely constrained, lab-based data collection and fully
unconstrained when the mobile devices are given to subjects to
use them as one’s own. There are in-between studies: authors of
[9] asked participants to use a self-made banking app. A similar
approach is used by Kolly et.al. [73] and De Luca et.al. [50]. In
[73] authors developed a mobile game that was used by 14,890
subjects. In [50] the authors asked subjects to input a password
pattern that consists of five strokes. There were 21 data collec-
tion sessions. Thus subjects were not limited to their choice of
location/environment, but they still had to perform a specific task.
6.4 How were experiments performed?
A summary of the papers shows that in behavioural biometrics,
recognition algorithms and thresholds are not trained using sep-
arate datasets. We did not find any studies that would divide data
into independent datasets (training, validation, testing) with non-
overlapping subjects. Even if there were some division performed,
all data subsets contained same subject different data. Thus the
use of the data in behavioural biometrics is different than when
dealing with traditional biometric modalities – e.g. facial recogni-
tion. An exception could be paper [73]. Its authors have collected
data from 14,890 subjects and test the recognition performance on
small subject groups – 2 to 15 people. The authors also claim that
“in all experiments, we have separated training and test datasets
to avoid overfitting”, but, unfortunately, they do not provide any
additional details.
The authors of [45] tested algorithms on two datasets, but it
was not disclosed whether the thresholds and other parameters
were fixed for both datasets or fine-tuned for each. Across the
papers, different biometric experiments are performed: verifica-
tion, closed-set identification or open-set identification. In [42],
verification experiments are conducted, and even the data were
collected in a way that would represent verification (1 : 1 scenario)
by asking imposters to enter the genuine user’s username.
In [49], [61], [74], and [79] the authors use open-set identifica-
tion. Shi et.al. [61] developed a data collection application which
was posted in the Android Marketplace and freely downloadable
by anyone. Among the 276 users who downloaded data collec-
tion application, the authors selected 50 users (who participated
over a period of 12 days or longer) as the genuine users and
selected subjects who have participated over a duration of 3 days
or longer to serve as impostors (so-called “unknown-unknowns”
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[39]). The authors of [49] recruited 23 genuine users that use their
own Android mobile devices and selected 100 impostors. A paper
presented by Inguanez et.al. [74] offers an interesting study – the
authors analyse text typed using an onscreen keyboard, focusing
on touch features and time intervals. They collected a dataset con-
sisting of 32 subjects. Of all touch data, 48 % is generated by one
subject, who represents the genuine device user. The remaining 31
users represent the imposters. In [79] the authors selected 28 out
of 75 subjects as target users. None of the papers offering open-set
identification experiments used ranking, and it is understandable
that this would not make much sense, since the task is to pro-
tect a single smartphone user, instead of finding a similarity in a
database. Open-set identification has the benefit of allowing the
addition of subjects which have partially participated in data col-
lection. In this way, one can test the system more thoroughly, with
a broader variety of imposters, since more imposters are scored
against each genuine template. In the remainder of the papers,
closed-set identification was performed.
Another aspect we were interested in is whether new sub-
jects can be quickly enrolled in the system, in case such veri-
fication/identification systems are used in real-life scenarios. In
Table 4 we can see that in this paper we assume that difficulty in
enrolling a subject arises from the way the classifier is crafted. If
a hand-crafted method is used that does not require any train-
ing, the only requirement to enrol someone new is to acquire the
person’s biometric sample(s). On the contrary, if machine learn-
ing methods are used as the classifier with k output classes, where
k = number of enrolled subjects, then every time a new subject
is enrolled, it would require the complete retraining the entire
system, which would not be usable for real-life applications.
We were pleased to find that in multiple cases new subject
enrollment is straightforward: Authors tend to use hand-crafted
methods: in [35] the authors use the average Euclidean dis-
tance between the reference template and probe sample; this
distance value represents the similarity between both samples.
[66] employs as the similarity metric normalised cross-correlation;
L1 and L2 norms. Articles [76], [50], and [80] uses Dynamic Time
Warping (DTW).
One-class classifiers are used for example, in [44] where the
authors performed experiments using three one-class verifiers:
scaled Manhattan (SM), scaled Euclidian (SE), and 1-class SVM,
since using a one-class approach there is no need for imposter
data during the training stage. In [43] an HMM-based behavioural
template training approach is presented, which does not require
training data from other subjects other than the owner of the
mobile device and can be updated with new data over time. [48]
uses a one class classifier, a nearest neighbour distance, to the
training data.
The paper by Kolly et.al. [73] presents a behavioural biomet-
rics dataset that is collected unusually. The authors developed
a mobile game for the Android platform that was freely down-
loadable by everyone. The game’s user interface used different
elements that users had to touch: buttons, lists, and radio buttons.
The mobile game was downloaded by 14,890 subjects. Overall 1
million button touch events and over 2 million list touch events
were generated while using the game app. Sadly, authors do not
present additional statistics about the collected data such as what
was the average interaction time with the ap and how long did the
data collection continue. There also weren’t many details about
how data was used. It was disclosed that subjects were not scored
in an All VS All scenario. Instead, the recognition experiment was
to recognise a person out of a set of 2 to 15 people, conclud-
ing that recognition rate drops when increasing the number of
subjects. The authors highlight and measure three properties of
touch: timing, pressure, and the position relative to the target.
[81] presents a prolonged study – authors have collected 200
subject data for 19 months. The data collected includes applica-
tion data, Bluetooth and Wi-Fi information. The authors present
recognition rates of four data types – application, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi
and combined. They offer results for consecutive day, week, and
month scenarios, concluding that there is a possibility that a day
is too short a period in "which to extract features" (at least for the
used features).
7 Papers in detail
In this section we will assess selected papers in detail. We have
selected six papers that present public datasets.
7.1 Frank et.al. [13] – “Touchalytics: On the Applicability of
Touchscreen Input as a Behavioral Biometric for Continuous
Authentication”
This paper’s hypothesis is that continuously recorded touch data
from a touchscreen is distinctive enough to serve as a behavioural
biometric. Both horizontally sliding and vertically sliding touch
actions are used. Android phones are given to 41 subjects; the
authors try to use a minimal number of different phones (four dif-
ferent phone models, five devices in total) because using different
mobile phones could artificially improve accuracy thus invalidat-
ing the results. During the data collection, subjects are unaware
of the actual purpose of the data collection. Subjects read various
articles (excerpts from featured Wikipedia articles) and find dif-
ferences between cartoon drawings. There are two data collection
sessions, a week apart.
The authors divide data records into individual strokes and pro-
pose the use of 30 hand-picked features. Informativeness of these
features and their mutual correlation are explored. Two differ-
ent classifiers, k-nearest neighbour and support vector machines
are used. First, a model is trained, after which the same model is
tested with the same subject’s unseen data. There are three appli-
cation scenarios (inter-week authentication, intersession authen-
tication and short-term authentication). Data and partial software
(a Matlab implementation of feature extractor) is published.
7.2 Yang et.al. [14] – “A Multimodal Data Set for Evaluating
Continuous Authentication Performance in Smartphones” and
Sitová et.al. [44] – “HMOG: New Behavioral Biometric
Features for Continuous Authentication of Smartphone
Users”
[14] introduces a comprehensive behavioural biometrics dataset.
Data is acquired from 100 subjects, and there are nine channels of
data - accelerometer, gyroscope, magnetometer, raw touch event,
tap gesture, scale gesture, scroll gesture, fling gesture and key press
on the virtual keyboard. Data were collected using an application
developed by the authors for Android phones. Subjects were asked
to perform three different type tasks: document reading, text pro-
duction and navigation on a map to locate a destination. For each
type of task, the volunteer either sits or walks while performing
the task (thus there are two operational scenarios). One attempt
lasts 5 to 15 minutes, and each volunteer is expected to perform
24 attempts (8 for each task type). In total, dataset consists 2 to 6
hours of each subject’s behavioural biometric data. The dataset is
publicly available, the total size of it after compression is 5.7 GB.
[44] offer baseline experiments for this dataset. The authors
propose a new set of behavioural biometric features for continu-
ous authentication, calling them “Hand Movement, Orientation,
and Grasp (HMOG)”. They propose the use of a one-class clas-
sifier [82]. In machine learning this means that the training set
contains only the objects of the class being recognised. This also
implies that to add a new client, the system needs to be re-
trained only using new subject’s data, and one does not need to
re-design the whole verification system. The authors use three
different one-class verifiers – scaled Manhattan, scaled Euclid-
ian, and 1-class SVM. From the original 100 subject dataset, ten
subjects are excluded due to an insufficient amount of data. To
improve authentication performance, the authors performed fea-
ture selection, feature transformation with Principal Component
Analysis (PCA) and outlier removal. For each verifier, HMOG fea-
tures were selected separately. For this the authors used 10-fold
cross-validation.
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Although the terms “training” and “testing” are used, in the
paper they refer to enrolment template and probe data (e.g. “we
used all training vectors to construct the template”; “we created
authentication vectors by averaging test vectors”; “authentica-
tion vector was matched against the template of the same user”).
This would also suggest that an algorithm’s ability to generalise
to unseen subjects is not investigated (for example by dividing
collected data into training, validation and test subsets, training
the model on one subset and acquiring the recognition rates on
another). This is not researched, and the system is tuned for a
particular set of subjects.
The authors conclude that HMOG features extracted from
both accelerometer and gyroscope outperformed those extracted
from individual sensors. The lowest Equal Error Rate (EER) was
achieved with a fusion of HMOG, tap, and keystroke features,
using Scaled Manhattan verifier. In this paper, acquired results are
also compared with six other author results (on similar datasets).
The authors also discuss biometric key generalisation from HMOG
features, and the balance between authentication performance
and mobile devices energy overheads, but these topics are out of
this survey’s scope.
Unfortunately, data protocols are not fully disclosed (e.g. which
ten subjects are excluded) and thus it is difficult to reproduce
the author’s experiments or compare results acquired with the
proposed baseline, and hence compare with other algorithmic
performances.
7.3 Eagle et.al. [34] – “Reality mining: sensing complex
social systems”
The authors introduce the “MIT Reality Mining Dataset” that con-
sists of 100 subject data collected over a period of nine months.
For the data collection, 100 Nokia 6600 mobile phones are used.
Information about call logs, Bluetooth information, cell tower
information, application usage, and phone status (such as charg-
ing and idle) are recorded. The dataset is publicly available. This
study is undertaken to explore the capabilities of the smartphones
and enable social scientists to investigate human interactions
beyond the traditional survey-based methodology, rather than as
a specific study about behavioural biometrics. This data set was
collected in 2004 and was first such large-scale database. Although
initially intended to study social behavioural, researchers have
used this dataset for behavioural biometric experiments, e.g. in
[83].
7.4 Antal et.al. [70] – “Identity information revealed from
mobile touch gestures” and [71] – “Information revealed from
scrolling interactions on mobile devices”
The authors present a publicly available scrolling touch data
database. It consists of 71 subjects behavioural data. Data cap-
ture consisted of four sessions, each a week apart. Users were
asked to perform two tasks – text reading that requires vertical
scrolling and image selection, requiring horizontal scrolling. For
each touch point timestamp, x and y coordinates, the pressure
and the area under the finger were recorded. [71], published in
2015, extends the research presented in [70], published in 2014.
[71] not only presents the recognition experiment results but also
tries to answer questions regarding obtaining information about
the subjects themselves: can a subject’s gender be determined
using touch swipe data; what separates male and female touch
data; is it possible to identify the subject’s experience level of
touchscreen usage.
The authors incorporate subject data into four different
datasets: Dataset 1 and 2 for subject classification, Dataset 3 for
gender classification and Dataset 4 for touchscreen experience
level classification. Unfortunately, there is no information given
or how data is distributed across the datasets, e.g. why the gen-
der classification dataset consists of just 18 subject data. Although
there are two separate datasets for the subject classification task,
the parameters for each dataset were fine-tuned separately.
7.5 Abate et.al. [65] – “Smartphone Enabled Person
Authentication Based on Ear Biometrics and Arm Gesture”
and [76] – “I-Am: Implicitly Authenticate Me Person
Authentication on Mobile Devices Through Ear Shape and
Arm Gesture”
The authors present a novel approach for incorporating physical
and behavioural biometric features into a biometric authenti-
cation system. They use accelerometer and gyroscope readings
to record arm gestures and use the phone’s secondary (frontal)
camera to acquire images of a subject’s ear. The idea is to cap-
ture these modalities when the subject is answering a phone call.
Arm dynamics should affect the smartphone motion pattern due
to behavioural and anatomical characteristics. Arm gesture data
in conjunction with the ear biometrics makes a compelling and
never-before viewed combination. The authors present a publi-
cally available (upon request by e-mail) database, consisting of 100
subject arm gesture and ear data. 30 of the 100 subjects partici-
pated in 3 data collection sessions (spread over a two week time
period). The remaining 70 subjects participated only in the first
session. Data is acquired using Samsung Galaxy S4 smartphone.
7.6 De Luca et.al. [50] – “Touch me once and I know it’s
you! Implicit Authentication based on Touch Screen Patterns”
In this paper the authors perform two sub-studies. The second
study’s database is made public (available upon request via e-
mail). The authors pay great attention to the data collection
process and the methods of how to make the study more unbi-
ased. They investigate, how to equip a shape-based unlocking
scheme with behavioural authentification methods. This is done
by exploiting the touch data when the subject is entering the
unlock shape.
The first study (data are not publicly available) is a time-limited,
lab-based, two-session study. In the study, subjects were asked to
unlock the data collection device by swipe (horizontal, vertical,
vertical with two fingers and diagonal unlock swipe patterns are
used for this experiment). In this study, subjects know the pur-
pose of the data collection and are asked to unlock the device, in
the same way, on every occasion. Data collection was performed
in two sessions, two days apart. The authors gave the data collect-
ing device (an Android Nexus One mobile phone) to the subjects
in a test mode, for them to get familiar with the task they needed
to perform. In the actual data collection, authors used two devices
- one for data collection and the other one for subject distraction.
After every 20 unlock tries, subjects had to input text of a text mes-
sage on the other phone. The second session was undertaken to
minimise the subjects’ habituation effects.
After this study, the authors performed a second experiment.
The reasoning was that not enough touch data was collected with
only two sessions in a lab setting and the fact that the subjects
know the original data collection’s purpose.
The follow-up study’s data is publicly available. In this study
the authors investigated the possibility of adding additional pro-
tection to the password pattern by using behavioural biometric
authentification. The password patterns consisted of five strokes
assigned randomly to the subjects. Subjects could practise their
issued password pattern as many times as necessary before the
actual data collection. After the practising stage was completed,
subjects were asked to execute one authentification per day for
21 days. Subjects could perform the authentification in an uncon-
strained environment. After completing the 21 sessions, partici-
pants were asked to attend a follow-up event, where the data was
copied from the devices and imposter data recorded by asking
subjects to input patterns of other participants using their device.
The premise was that the imposter knows the genuine user’s pass-
word pattern. Since devices used by the participants varied, only
the generated data of users, who owned the same type device were
used as the imposter data.
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8 General Data Protection Regulation
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [24] is a European
Union (EU) legal requirement on data protection. GDPR enables
citizens of EU to control their data. It became enforceable on
25 May 2018 ([24], Article 99), after a two-year transition period,
replacing the 1995 Data Protection Directive.
The GDPR Article 4.14 defines that biometric data is “personal
data resulting from specific technical processing relating to the
physical, physiological or behavioural characteristics of a natu-
ral person, which allow or confirm the unique identification of
that natural person, such as facial images or dactyloscopic (fin-
gerprint) data”. This broad definition implicitly acknowledges that
biometric technology will continue to evolve [84]. The definition
recognizes traditional biometric features as well as behavioural
biometrics. The extent of the possible behavioural biometric fea-
tures is not clear from this definition, since the definition raises a
question what does unique identification implies – is the purpose
of the use of biometrics for identification/authentification enough
to consider it to be a unique identification or will a certain level of
precision have to be reached to assume that the biometric feature
in question delivers unique identification?
The significant change regarding biometrics when the exist-
ing Data Protection Directive is compared with GDPR is that the
GDPR recognises biometric data as a subset of sensitive personal
data [84, 85]. The new directive, Article 9.1 states that process-
ing of such data is prohibited. Fortunately, there are exceptions
for processing “special categories of personal data”. The general
exception – if the “data subject has given explicit consent to the
processing of those personal data for one or more specified pur-
poses” (Article 9.2a). This means that biometrics can still be used
in various kinds of application but a user’s consent is mandatory
and a special care is necessary to collect, store and use the data.
Use of special category data is still allowed for scientific research
purposes (Article 9.2j).
Data processing is defined (Article 4.2) as “any operation or set
of operations which is performed on personal data or on sets of
personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as col-
lection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation
or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmis-
sion, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or
combination, restriction, erasure or destruction”. The definition
states that even storage of such data is something that falls under
the GDPR and that requires a special care; this also applies to the
scientific community.
The most concern for the scientific community arises from
the distinct care required with the special category data. GDPR
Article 28.2 says that the processor (defined as “natural or legal
person, public authority, agency or other body which processes
personal data on behalf of the controller”, GDPR Article 4.8) shall
not engage another processor without prior specific or general
written authorisation of the controller”. In other words, this man-
dates a strict system of how to access and use data inside scientific
organisations including sharing the data across researchers and
organisations.
GDPR Article 17 defines the Right To Erasure (or Right To Be
Forgotten). The data subject, at any time, can withdraw his or
her consent and their data must be deleted. GDPR Article 17.2.
states that “where the controller has made the personal data pub-
lic and is obligated (..) to erase the personal data, the controller
(..) shall take reasonable steps, including technical measures, to
inform controllers which are processing the personal data that the
data subject has requested the erasure by such controllers of any
links to, or copy or replication of, those personal data.” This would
imply that anyone at any time can ask to withdraw their biometric
data from the database. If the data are published, the institution
that published the data have to ask the third parties to delete the
subject’s data in question, but GDPR Article 17.2. releases the orig-
inal authors from liability if the 3rd party does not cooperate. The
sharing of data still would mandate a written authorisation, as
stated in the Article 28.2.
GDPR Article 17.3.d states that Right To Be Forgotten does not
apply to the extent that processing is necessary “for archiving
purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research
purposes or statistical purposes in accordance with Article 89.1”,
which comments on the necessary technical and organisational
measures that need to be in place. Article 89.1 also states that
“Those measures may include pseudonymisation provided that
those purposes can be fulfilled in that manner. Where those pur-
poses can be fulfilled by further processing which does not permit
or no longer permits the identification of data subjects, those
purposes shall be fulfilled in that manner.” The Right To Be For-
gotten does not necessarily relate to the biometric databases if
used for scientific purposes but it is not entirely apparent what
the last sentence implies: does data subject pseudonymisation is
enough or biometrical data should be distorted to not permit the
identification?
GDPR Article 25 defines “Data protection by design and by
default”. The article states that the data controller shall “imple-
ment appropriate technical and organisational measures, such
as pseudonymisation, which are designed to implement data-
protection principles, such as data minimisation, in an effective
manner and to integrate the necessary safeguards into the pro-
cessing in order to meet the requirements of this Regulation and
protect the rights of data subjects”. Similarly, as with the previous
point, it is not apparent how extensive these measures should be.
Summarising the GDPR with respect to biometrics one can con-
clude that it tries to organise and regulate all the aspects of a
natural person’s data usage. It has an enormous effect on bio-
metric data and its use in the scientific community. One positive
outcome is that finally these aspects are being regulated at the
European Union’s level. Unfortunately, there are currently many
questions and no known precedent or guidelines how the nec-
essary mechanisms (Right To Be Forgotten; Data protection by
design and by default; data processing; data sharing) should be
implemented and maintained while collecting, using and sharing
biometric data for scientific reasons.
[86] states an interesting concept that entities like to experi-
ment with new technologies (e.g. biometrics) because they are
accessible. It is possible that because of the high data require-
ments set by the GDPR this trend will change, and companies
will evaluate more carefully whenever they want to interact and
handle the special categories of personal data.
9 Conclusions
In [87] five levels of reproducibility are defined: Reviewable
Research; Replicable Research; Confirmable Research; Auditable
Research; Open or Reproducible Research. Unfortunately, most
of the papers published in the field of behavioural biometrics
fall under the first level “Reviewable Research” – “The descrip-
tions of the research methods can be independently assessed and
the results judged credibly. This includes both traditional peer
review and community review and does not necessarily imply
reproducibility” [87].
Although we cannot prove that there is a correlation between
data publishing and citation count, we still think that it is bene-
ficial, if not for the researcher itself, then for the whole research
community to publish databases and software for result reproduc-
tion. There is a gap for reproducible research and grand challenges
to be made (similarly to the GBU [31] in face recognition) in the
field of behavioural biometrics.
There seems to be a need for standardisation and guidelines
on how biometric experiments should be performed to enable
authors to implement how training is to be conducted and how
to compute results.
The GDPR tries to regulate a somewhat grey area of personal
data, including biometrics. Only time will tell how it will be
interpreted by businesses, researchers and the general society.
Regarding research in biometrics and GDPR – hopefully issues will
become more apparent and there will be precedents of implemen-
tation of the necessary technical and organisational measures.
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